Muhammad Asghar Harifal: Pakistan couldn’t break with the bureaucratic machinery inherited from British colonial period. It was the apparatus that was extractive in nature and has, over time, become rigid, inefficient, and increasingly disconnected from contemporary realities. The democratic structure in any form, whatsoever, was already fragile while the coercive tendency of inherited colonial machinery further diminished the chances of public representation in state machinery. Worse, the politicians, inheriting powers after independence, were no less in awe from colonisers than the latter’s educated and trained tapparatchiks of bureaucracy. The colonial aura, pervasive both in politicains and the bureacracy, generated a fear of anarchy wihtout the colonisers’ designed state machinery.
Resultantly, Instead of undergoing meaningful reform after independence, much of this system has ossified into a self-preserving structure. Those operating within it often fail to recognise its undemocratic origins, or else defend it due to vested interests. This resistance to change is reinforced by an education system that discourages innovation and critical thinking, and by weak democratic institutions that have been unable to enforce accountability or sustained reform. Now that mammoth structure is creaking under its own weight on its own.
Seen against this backdrop, the decision by the Chief Minister of Balochistan to abolish the Food and Zakat Departments is a bold and a long-awaited step. It represents a rare, non-conformist intervention in a governance culture that generally prioritises continuity over performance. The greatest weakness of Pakistan’s bureaucratic system is its devotion to the status quo—an instinct that shields outdated institutions from scrutiny. By challenging this inertia, the provincial government has sent an important signal: institutional permanence cannot be justified merely by tradition.
Such a step has the potential to generate a broader ripple effect within the administrative machinery. It may embolden officials and policymakers to pursue reform without fear of institutional backlash—a fear deeply embedded in government service, where deviation from established practice is often met with collective resistance. Breaking this pattern is essential if governance is to respond meaningfully to evolving economic and social conditions.
Historically, state control over food procurement and storage emerged in response to extraordinary circumstances. Organised storage of staple commodities, in particular wheat, has been associated with natural and man-made calamities and wartime exigencies. In British India, the existing structure of food and supply departments was institutionalised during the Second World War to manage rationing, stabilise prices, and ensure uninterrupted supplies, especially for military and urban populations. Until sugar de-rationing in 1984, even sugar distribution remained tightly controlled through rationing systems administered by these departments.
Among the provinces, only Punjab is broadly wheat-sufficient, producing nearly 70 percent of the country’s output and supplying deficits elsewhere. Pakistan’s annual wheat requirement stands at approximately 28 MMT. Balochistan, being sparsely populated, has the lowest requirement, with annual consumption estimated at around 1.8 MMT, while production ranges between 1.0 and 1.15 MMT. This deficit can be substantially reduced through yield-per-acre improvements and the solarisation of groundwater extraction, rather than through costly and inefficient procurement.
Regional dynamics further weaken the case for heavy state involvement in wheat markets. Afghanistan, which previously exerted demand pressure on Pakistan’s wheat supply, now meets nearly 70 percent of its requirements through domestic production and sources its remaining deficit—about 2 million tons—from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, and India. This shift has eased external pressure on Pakistan’s wheat market and created space for greater private-sector participation, allowing the public sector to gradually exit direct wheat trade.
Moreover, under IMF-mandated structural reforms, Pakistan has committed to deregulating the food chain, including the withdrawal of federally determined wheat support prices. In the name of staple food subsidies and price stability, a convoluted procurement and subsidy system has evolved—one that may have served a purpose in its early years but has long since been overtaken by changes in agricultural technology and market structures. Rather than supporting small farmers or boosting output, wheat subsidies have disproportionately benefited affluent and politically connected landlords. A subsidy-dependent class has emerged—economically powerful, politically influential, and closely aligned with entrenched interests.
With advancement in agriculture technology it is no longer an issue to meet a fraction of deficit through alternative means, rather than continuing with century old arrangements of storing a huge stock with poor management of public institutions.
In Balochistan, the limitations of this system are particularly stark. The province’s maximum annual wheat procurement target has rarely exceeded 0.1 million tons—approximately 5% of total consumption—despite an available storage capacity of about 0.18 million tons across more than 40 storage centres. Such a small procurement volume is insufficient to influence market prices, ensure supply stability, or incentivise increased production. Worse, government procurement has largely benefited influential farmers, having political clout, with minimal reach to smallholders. A government stock of barely five percent of consumption can neither stabilise prices nor guarantee sustained supply.
Put simply, limited government procurement does not drive agricultural production. What Pakistan requires is a meaningful scaling-up of productivity through improved inputs, better technology, expanded market access, and targeted farmer support—not the continuation of an outdated procurement model that delivers little beyond fiscal burden and rent-seeking opportunities.
Some are likely to argue that abolishing the Food Department will undermining food security, in particular during periods of prices instability or supply disruption. This concern, however valid, conflates institutional form with policy function. Food security is not dependent on the existence of a specific department, but on the effectiveness of the mechanisms deployed to ensure availability, affordability, and access. In practice, the Food Department’s limited procurement—amounting to less than six percent of provincial consumption—has neither stabilised prices nor protected vulnerable consumers. Modern food security is better ensured through diversified supply chains, private-sector participation, strategic reserves managed by agile regulatory authorities, and targeted social protection programmes. Retaining an inefficient institution for symbolic reassurance does little to protect consumers; redesigning policy instruments to match current market realities does far more.
The abolition of the Food Department in Balochistan should therefore be understood not as a retreat from food security, but as an opportunity to rethink how that objective is best achieved. If accompanied by coherent and well-designed policy alternatives, this reform could mark an important step toward a more rational, efficient, and accountable governance framework—one guided by present-day realities rather than colonial-era assumptions.
The Food Department, however, is not an isolated relic; it is part of a broader administrative edifice afflicted by similar structural weaknesses. Over time, the unchecked expansion of authority without corresponding accountability across multiple departments has distorted the state’s institutional framework. Simply replacing one department with another risks reproducing the same inefficiencies. Instead, governance should move toward leaner, more agile regulatory authorities. In this context, the existing Food Control Authority offers a more effective and sustainable alternative—one better suited to regulation and oversight than cumbersome departmental structures. Reform, to be meaningful, must go beyond symbolic abolition. But by questioning the permanence of outdated institutions, the Balochistan government has taken a necessary first step.
The writer is a senior government officer serving in Balochistan.
